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Bargaining in the CSU: How It Works
California's Higher Education Employer-Employee
Relations Act (HEERA) establishes a mechanism or process for collective
bargaining that is required of the CSU, the UC, and the unions representing
employees in both of these systems. In its simplest form, this process
involves four phases: public notice, bargaining, impasse, and what
might be called "final" impasse.
Public Notice
The first step in the bargaining process
envisioned by HEERA is public notice, sometimes called the "sunshine"
process. In theory, public notice puts the citizens of California
on notice about the terms and conditions of employment which both
the public employer and public employees believe appropriate, so
that the public can comment and, in so doing, influence the ultimate
establishment of public policy as codified in the collective bargaining
agreement. In practice, however, there has never been a recognizable
"public" in California which cares about the process,
and other than attracting the occasional notice of a government
"gadfly," the entire process has degenerated into nothing
more than a mechanical obligation at the beginning of the proposal
exchange process.
Bargaining
Following the initial announcement of their
bargaining goals (public notice), the union and the employer engage
in the face-to-face negotiations, which constitute the heart of
collective bargaining. Many contract negotiations (and perhaps most
negotiations outside of the CSU) are successfully concluded at this
stage. If agreement is not possible, however, the law next provides
for two specific steps, which constitute the statute's "impasse"
procedures.
Mediation
If, after a reasonable period of bargaining,
the parties are unable to conclude an agreement, HEERA allows either
(or both) to request that California's Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB), which administers HEERA, issue a finding of impasse.
In this request, a variety of information is provided the Board,
including the length of time spent bargaining, a listing of resolved
issues, and a listing of unresolved issues. Recently, the Board
has approved such impasse requests on a largely pro forma basis,
and can be expected to approve virtually any such request within
a period of about two weeks. Upon declaration of impasse, PERB informs
the State Mediation and Conciliation Service, which assigns a mediator
(a State employee) to assist the parties in a voluntary resolution
of their disagreements.
Due to the heavy workload of these mediators,
as well as the nature of the mediation process itself, the mediation
phase of the process frequently involves several months of sporadic
meetings. During this time, the mediator meets individually and
collectively with the parties in search of a settlement. When (and
if) the mediator reaches the conclusion that mediation cannot produce
a settlement, he/she is authorized by law to certify the dispute
for the next step of the bargaining process: fact-finding.
Fact-Finding
Upon receipt of a fact-finding certification
from a mediator, PERB provides the parties with a list of proposed
neutral individuals to assist in the fact-finding process. The person
ultimately selected by the parties as the fact-finder is charged
with chairing a three-member fact-finding panel, which includes
one representative from the employer and one from the union. Although
this panel is responsible for an examination of the facts supporting
the positions of both parties by means of hearing and briefs, the
process most frequently deals with the arguments and political postures
of the parties that underlie the dispute. Following these deliberations
(which sometimes take on the semblance of a mini negotiation or
mediation), the panel issues a written report, which contains its
non-binding recommendations for settlement of the dispute. If the
panel's recommendation is unanimous, it is generally presumed that
a contract settlement (in the form of the report) has been reached.
A 2-to-1 vote, on the other hand, signifies that the neutral fact-finder
has sided with one party or the other in a manner unacceptable to
the dissenting voter. Although under statute fact-finding is intended
to run on a fairly tight schedule of approximately one month, a
variety of factors such as the complexity of the dispute and scheduling
problems often can result in a much longer time period.
Following the issuance of the fact-finding
report, HEERA requires a "black out" period of 10 days
before the fact-finding report may be made public. This is to allow
time for the parties, if possible, to reach a settlement based on
the report without being subject to external pressures. The publication
of the report represents the final, required step in the HEERA bargaining
process.
"Final" Impasse
With the required steps of the bargaining
law completedand no agreement reachedneither party is
under any obligation to continue discussion of the disputed contract
issues. In that scenario, however, the status of those disputed
issues must be addressed. Under traditional American labor law and
theory, with the bargaining obligation exhausted, the employer is
considered free to exercise its traditional "management right"
to run its operation as it sees fit. As a practical matter, this
means that an employer may impose on the employees its view of the
conditions of employment in dispute (such as occurred in the CSEA-CSU
dispute in 1995-1996 and the CFA-CSU dispute in 1999), a practice
commonly referred to as "imposition" or "unilateral
implementation."
Here it is important to understand that
the employer is not imposing a contract but rather only certain
employment conditions which exist outside of the contractual setting.
Moreover, three important restrictions are traditionally applied
to management's rights:
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1)
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Terms and conditions
of employment may be imposed only if the employer has bargained
in good faith during the preceding process (which explains why
most unions tend to have unfair labor practice charges pending
as a hedge against unilateral implementation). |
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2)
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An employer
may not impose working conditions at odds with the law. (For
instance, CSU could not violate the large body of California
Government Code and Education Code provisions that are applicable
to State and CSU employment.) |
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3)
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An employer may not impose
conditions that are not consonant with positions previously
taken at the bargaining table. (For instance, CSU could not
impose a 3% salary increase after having proposed 3.4% at the
table, a fact which helps explain why CSU prefers to make informal,
"off the record" proposals for which it cannot be
held responsible in final impasse.) |
In another interesting wrinkle, any substantive
change in circumstances (such as passage of a new State budget or
a substantive change in position by either party on disputed issues)
triggers a resumption of the HEERA bargaining obligation with all
of the bargaining requirements again in full effect.
Current State of HEERA
Unfortunately, many elements of HEERA, particularly
its impasse mechanisms, have not worked effectively since the inception
of the Act. No matter the theories of "good faith" bargaining
which underlie all collective bargaining statutes, it is simply
unrealistic to anticipate that the party with superior power in
the process (most frequently the employer) will do anything other
than rely on that power to accomplish a completion of bargaining
(a "settlement") without relinquishing any of the power
at hand.
Under HEERA, this tendency has been exacerbated
by the fact that the final phase of the process, fact-finding, is
non-binding on the parties. Rather than be concerned with the results
of the fact-finding, the party in the superior power position simply
can wait out the process and then do what it intended from the beginning.
This lack of finality also has corrupted the fact-finding process
itself, as neutral fact-finders routinely "shade" the
facts of the dispute to appease the party with power. Given that
the goal of the fact-finder is to achieve a settlementat whatever
costany fact-finding report favoring the weaker party will
be rejected out-of-hand by the stronger party, thus prolonging the
dispute. Fact-finders therefore virtually always favor the stronger
party, which then most frequently uses the report to beat the other
party into submission . . . submission usually being
preferable to working without a contract.
For these and other reasons, virtually
all higher education unions operating in California, including APC,
have devoted substantial effort to attempts to reform various aspects
of HEERA. While some progress has been made in the face of major
opposition from the CSU and UC, differences among the unions on
impasse resolution mechanisms (for example, right to strike vs.
the resolution of bargaining disputes through binding arbitration)
has slowed the effort. Additionally, it appears that a number of
the Legislature's traditional power brokers (those who, ironically,
complain the most loudly when called upon to assist their nominal
labor allies in obtaining fair contracts) actually prefer the current
statute. If the collective bargaining process actually worked by
leveling the proverbial "playing field," the standing
of these very same power brokers would be diminished, something
they do not relish (protestations notwithstanding).
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8/8/03
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